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FARMERS, RANCHERS, AND THE RAILROAD 
THE EVOLUTION OF FENCE LAW IN THE GREAT PLAINS, 1865~1900 
YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA 
In North America, building fences was an 
essential part of life for the English settlers from 
the beginning. Departing from the English 
common law rule that required owners to fence 
in their cattle, nearly all the colonial legisla-
tures and courts imposed upon landowners a 
duty to fence their property against trespassing 
cattle. l The reasons were partly to increase 
the meager supply of livestock by permitting 
cattle to wander about in order to breed faster 
and partly to make full use of the vast virgin 
forest and grassland. Gradually, however, in 
New England and in much of New York and 
New Jersey, where township settlement and 
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mixed husbandry prevailed, this practice was 
replaced by the system of common pasturage. 
During the crop growing season, common pas-
ture was set off and fenced, and herdsmen were 
employed by the towns to supervise grazing, but 
after harvest animals were allowed to roam at 
large until spring planting.2 
In the southern colonies, where settlements 
were made by individuals without group cooper-
ation, the landowners' liability was more strictly 
observed. Quite different from the New England 
practice, all the southern colonies prohibited 
the fencing of any land except the fields under 
actual cultivation. Thus nonlandholders com-
monly grazed their cattle and hogs on others' 
land. As late as the 1830s, Virginia planters were 
still trying to obtain legislation to permit the 
fencing of their whole estates or at least their 
pastures. The prohibition on fencing continued 
to prevail on each moving frontier, while in the 
older regions the open range gave way to the 
common law rule as they were more settled.3 
FENCING IN THE GREAT PLAINS 
The Great Plains underwent a similar 
experience. One after another, the Plains 
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FIG. 1. The Great Plains Environment. Reproduced from The Great Plains by Walter Prescott Webb (1931; 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981). 
states confirmed the rule of fencing that came 
to characterize all earlier American fron-
tiers, requiring farmers to fence out domestic 
animals, which were allowed to run at large 
without liability. Yet the unique natural influ-
ence and social environment in the Great 
Plains did modify the traditional pattern of 
the open range in the East. The fencing con-
flicts between farmers and cattlemen in the 
Great Plains, as Walter Prescott Webb points 
out, greatly intensified and changed what had 
been a predominantly individual quarrel into 
an antagonistic confrontation.4 Gradually, 
however, as farmers came to predominate, they 
compelled the adoption of herd laws, freeing 
them of the obligation to fence and imposing 
liability on the owners of animals. Although 
the pace of the process differed from place to 
place, the animal liability laws in the Plains 
reverted to the principles established in English 
common law. 
This article is divided into three parts. 
The first examines specific fencing policies 
in Kansas, Nebraska, and other Plains states, 
highlighting the transformation from the 
"fence-out" to "fence-in" (herd laws) policies. 
The second part discusses the coming of the 
railroads to the Great Plains and the farmers 
and the ranchers as beneficiaries who soon 
became victims. And finally, the third sec-
tion analyzes railroad fence laws passed in 
Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, the litiga-
tion over loss of livestock, and the unfavorable 
position the state courts generally took toward 
the railroads, based upon the dual nature of the 
railroad fence law. 
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FENCING POLICIES 
As early as 1855, Kansas's first territorial 
legislature enacted a law imposing a duty upon 
landowners to fence "all fields and inclosure," 
specifying how a lawful fence must be con-
structed. "If any horse, cattle or other stock 
shall break into any inclosure" protected by 
a legal fence, the owner of the livestock was 
to pay the injured party full compensation. 
Unless his land was enclosed by a lawful fence, 
the landowner could not recover. This law cer-
tainly reflected the situation in the mid-nine-
teenth-century Great Plains, an "open range" 
country; the wide prairies could be made most 
productive by cattle grazing, and it was absurd 
to impose upon stock owners the common law 
duty of keeping their animals confined to their 
own land.s Fencing in the Great Plains, where 
timber was short, was a challenge for the set-
tlers. They started with zigzag rail fence, but 
as they quickly exhausted timber, they turned 
to hedges, especially of Osage orange, which 
came to be extensively used in the eastern part 
of Kansas and Nebraska. As the fence law came 
gradually to be counterbalanced by herd laws, 
farmers made few enclosures before barbed wire 
became widely used.6 
In 1868 Kansas farmers were able to secure 
the "night herd law," which gave the electors of 
each township the power to decide whether the 
owners should "fence in" their stock during the 
night. Two years later, another law passed pro-
viding for a regular (both night and day) herd 
law but limiting it to only five counties. It was 
declared unconstitutional in the case of Darling 
v. Rodgers (1871) because it operated in only a 
limited area, contrary to the equal treatment of 
counties guaranteed by the state constitution. 
The legislature accordingly passed another law 
in 1872 authorizing the county commissioners 
to decide on the adoption of the herd law, and 
by the end of the year, twenty-six counties out 
of the seventy-two adopted the herd law.? It 
was not until 1889 that the general herd law 
passed, making it applicable to all the coun-
ties and requiring all animals to be fenced in. 
This statute became the basis for the Herd Law 
of 1929, which was applicable to all livestock 
throughout the state.8 
Many other Plains states-Nebraska, Colo-
rado, Montana, Texas, and Wyoming, as well as 
Idaho and Nevada-followed suit? The imple-
mentation of herd laws was usually the result of 
a long struggle of farmers, who favored the strict 
liability principle of the common law, against 
stock raisers, who held on to the "open range" 
policy embodied in the fence law.lO Only Utah, 
Dakota, and Oklahoma opted for the fence-in 
policy in their early stages of development.ll By 
the time Oklahoma adopted its first fence law 
in 1890, the practice of allowing stock to roam 
freely was rapidly disappearing from the Great 
Plains. The Oklahoma statute provided that 
every owner of swine, sheep, goats, stallions, 
jacks, and all other stock should restrain his 
animals from running at large "at all seasons of 
the year." The county commissioners, however, 
on a petition signed by twenty-five resident 
freeholders, could divide their counties into 
districts and select some districts for stock to 
run at large, except for swine, sheep, goats, stal-
lions, and jacks. The decision should be made 
based upon the condition of the land, whether 
watered, timbered, or prairie, its streams, and 
whether the land was best adapted to agricul-
ture or srock raising. 
COMING OF THE RAILROADS 
The coming of the railroads to the Plains 
complicated the struggle between farmers and 
ranchers that had been taking place during the 
1870s and 1880s. Now they had to take on their 
common enemy, the railroads, which became 
the center of controversy because the railroads 
not only killed so many animals but also caused 
indirectly the devastation of their fields.!2 
The first transcontinental railroad, con-
structed by the Union Pacific and the Central 
Pacific, completed in May 1869, stimulated 
the construction of other transcontinental 
lines and a network of feeder lines: the Kansas 
Pacific; the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe; 
the Southern Pacific; the Northern Pacific; 
the Great Northern; the Missouri Pacific; the 
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FIG. 3. Early transcontinental railroad lines, 1887. From "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History 
of the American West by Richard White. Copyright © 1991 by the University of Oklahoma Press, Norman. 
Reprinted by permission of the publisher. All Rights Reserved. 
Railway Company alone killed 1,948 animals 
in the three states where it operated, costing 
about $25,000. The Texas and Pacific for 1877-78 
reported that it cost $65.84 per mile to operate 
the line in order to cover the loss of livestock. 
The Denver and Rio Grande Railroad killed 
at least $25,000 worth of livestock during the 
winter of 1884. The losses were estimated to be 
even larger along the Union Pacific line.18 
The problem was that the animals became 
attracted to the railroad right of way, where 
they could find greener grass, shelter from 
winds, and higher, drier ground. Moreover, the 
railroads not only had to pass through a wider 
range of land in the Great Plains but also had 
to confront the greater herds of livestock roam-
ing the range.19 Although both passenger and 
freight trains were "in perpetual danger from 
cattle straying" on the tracks, the railroads 
were reluctant to assume the high cost of 
enclosing their extensive rights of way. 
ENACTMENT OF RAILROAD FENCE LAWS 
The Plains state legislatures heatedly 
debated the problem of assigning responsibility 
and liability for the loss of animals and injury 
to train passengers. Could the cattlemen along 
the railroads' rights of way be required to 
enclose their stock, should the railway compa-
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though numerous, involved losses of small 
numbers of domestic animals, without causing 
much damage to the trains and serious loss of 
property and life among the passengers.29 
Suits were usually instituted by the animal 
owners at the justice of the peace, who rou-
tinely awarded the plaintiffs damages, and then 
the cases were appealed by the railroads to the 
county courts, where they were tried by jury. 
After favorable judgments for the plaintiffs, the 
railroads appealed to the state supreme court. 
Not only were the lawsuits a lengthy process, 
taking about two years, but the reversal rate 
was also very high. In Kansas, for example, the 
Supreme Court heard fifty-four appeals during 
the period from 1869 to 1914, all but two of 
which were appealed by the defendant railroad 
companies. In twenty out of the fifty-two cases, 
the highest court reversed the decisions in 
favor of the appellant railroads (39%).30 
This litigation was also expensive, often 
costing more than the value of the property 
destroyed. The Kansas Act of 1874 authorized 
the allowance of an attorney's fee when judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff,3l and the 
court began awarding attorney's fees to suc-
cessful plaintiffs: $15 on $35 damages, $33 on 
$90 damages, $30 on $30 for a heifer killed. In 
1876, when the plaintiff asked for a $25 attor-
ney's fee on the award of $39 for the value of 
a steer and a heifer killed, the Kansas Pacific's 
counsel protested. The court, however, found 
the plaintiff's request reasonable, because if 
he was compelled to pay his own attorney's 
fees, the amount of his claim (uniformly small) 
would be consumed by attorney's fees, leaving 
the plaintiff in no better position than before.32 
In an 1878 case, however, the Kansas Supreme 
Court denied a thirty-dollar attorney's fee, 
although the plaintiff was awarded two hun-
dred dollars for the damage done to two mares, 
on the grounds that the railroad was found only 
partially liable. Such fees were allowed, the 
court reasoned, only in an action in which the 
company had full liability under the statute.33 
One form of protest the railroads used 
against the fencing obligation was to challenge 
the railroad-fence legislation on constitutional 
grounds. Two years after its passage, the Kansas 
Act of 1874 was challenged by Kansas Pacific, 
which had been ordered to pay thirty-nine 
dollars for killing a steer and a heifer. The 
railroad's lawyers insisted that the company's 
liability under this act could not be derived 
from the common law, but the court declared 
the act constitutional because the power to 
impose such liability came from the police 
power of the state.34 
In 1890, when the Missouri Pacific was sued 
under a new Kansas law, "An Act to Compel 
Railroad Companies to Fence Their Roads by 
and through Lands Enclosed with a Lawful 
Fence," for reimbursement of the expense the 
landowner incurred to fence the railroad side 
of his land, it challenged the constitutionality 
of the law, which was based upon the law of 
1874. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, 
rejected the Missouri Pacific's assertion and 
declared the law constitutional and valid, 
insisting that it was in accordance with the 
decision of Kansas Pacific Railway Company 
v. Mower (1876), which had been upheld and 
approved.35 
Although they could not successfully chal-
lenge the basic premises of the railroad fence 
laws, the railroad companies were able to 
convince the courts to declare laws unconstitu-
tional on peripheral matters. Two cases, coming 
from two of the Great Basin states, which 
Webb included in the Great Plains environ-
ment, dealt with such issues. In 1885 Northern 
Pacific challenged the validity of Montana's 
1881 "Act to Provide for the Payment of Stock 
Killed or Injured by Railroads" and argued that 
the clause "the findings of such appraisers shall 
be taken and held to be conclusive evidence 
of the value and ownership of and the injury 
to such stock" prevented the company from 
exercising its rights of appeal from the finding 
of the appraisers, thus depriving it of the right 
of trial by jury. The court ruled for the railroad, 
holding that such a provision was in fact in 
conflict with the U.S. Constitution.36 
Four years later, the Union Pacific was also 
successful in challenging the validity of the 
Idaho railroad fence law of 1878. The company 
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protested that the law was unconstitutional 
because it made the killing of an animal by 
legitimate railroad companies, which were run-
ning trains legally and for great public benefit, 
the only test of its liability, nor did any general 
Idaho statute require railroad companies to 
fence their tracks. The court agreed and ruled 
that the law, by making the killing of an animal 
by the railroad the sole liability test, deprived 
it of the "due process of law" guaranteed by the 
u.s. Constitution.37 
The railroads not only challenged the valid-
ity of the laws but also tried to interpret them 
strictly, especially the extent of injury, in order 
to evade their liability. In 1878 the Atchison, 
Topeka, and Santa Fe railroad was sued for 
fatally injuring a mare that got onto the track 
at a site where it was not fenced. Frightened by 
an approaching train, she fled and reached a tie 
bridge, where her leg fell between the ties, caus-
ing injury. The railroad insisted that the injury 
had not been caused "by the engine or cars ... 
in operating such railway," as required by the 
act of 1874. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled, 
however, that the liability was not limited to 
cases of "actual collision" but extended to those 
cases where the animal was injured "in any 
other manner."38 The same court subsequently 
decided several cases similarly. 
Damage to livestock after it escaped from 
the right of way was not usually a natural con-
sequence of the railroad's failure to construct 
and maintain proper fences. The railroad 
appellants won several cases in which the 
railroads had originally been held liable for 
such damages,39 but they were nevertheless 
usually unsuccessful in preventing the Kansas 
Supreme Court from broadening the scope of 
their liability for the injury of stock. They were 
even held liable for "the stock that wandered 
/ away from the right of way and became lost" 
and for "a horse which, while on its right of way 
became frightened, and was killed by running 
into a fence not on the right of way."40 
In Texas, the railroads were more success-
ful in convincing the court to strictly limit 
the scope of the injury defined by the railroad 
fence law. In 1887 the International and Great 
Northern Railroad Company, when sued for an 
injury an animal incurred upon the trestle, onto 
which the animal had run frightened by the 
train, argued that there was no contact between 
the animal and the train. The Texas Supreme 
Court, to which the case was appealed, agreed 
and reversed the judgment below in favor of the 
railroad, stating that in no case could a recovery 
be had for an injury to animals where there 
was no collision with a moving engine or car. 
In some cases, the court did recognize that the 
injury, without collision, might be the proxi-
mate result of the railroad's negligence, but the 
recovery in such cases would not be based upon 
the railroad fence law of 1879.41 
The railroads also tried to disclaim their 
liability to their own employees in accidents 
resulting from their failure to fence the rights 
of way. In 1896, for example, James Quill, 
a locomotive engineer of the Houston and 
Texas Central Railway Company, was killed 
by the derailment of his engine as the result of 
a collision with cattle that had entered upon 
the track through the company's negligence 
to keep its fence in repair. In a suit insti-
tuted by his wife and daughter, the railroad 
company not only insisted that Quill knew 
that the fence was defective and cattle were 
getting within the enclosure but presented 
evidence that Quill had previously struck 
cattle and horses with his locomotive at eight 
different times during a fifteen-month period 
and was reprimanded for killing so many 
stock. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that 
Quill had assumed the risk, but the plaintiffs 
could recover if the deceased did not know of 
the defective fence.42 
Railroads could also disclaim their liabil-
ity when accidents occurred in public places, 
where the railroads were not required to fence 
their rights of way. Although the railroad 
fence statutes seldom specified liability in such 
areas,43 the courts in construing the statutes 
interpolated certain exceptions and held that 
the statute was inapplicable whenever superior 
obligation forbade a fence. 
Where a railroad was laid along a public 
street in a city, town, or village, the company 
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was not required or permitted to fence its track, 
nor was it required to fence its track at its 
switch limits within a municipality or to fence 
across legally laid out highways crossing its 
tracks. Thus a railroad was not liable for injur-
ing cattle at night in the switch area.44 
The railroads tried to disclaim their liability 
by broadly defining the areas in which they 
were immune from building fences. The courts 
in Kansas and many other Plains states, how-
ever, continually ruled that the railroad could 
not evade its liability for not fencing even 
within the limits of a municipality, if such 
fences would not obstruct the streets, highways, 
or public guards.45 
The Texas Supreme Court, in the case 
of International and Great Northern Railway 
Company v. Cocke (1885), clarified the com-
pany's liability at public crossings for damage 
to stock, stating that the situation was the 
same as if the road were fenced. If, therefore, 
stock were lawfully running at large, the 
company was liable for injury to stock only 
when it failed to exercise ordinary care. If, 
on the other hand, animals were running 
at large illegally, the company would not be 
responsible for injury, unless the company 
was grossly negligent.46 The same court two 
years later specifically enumerated the places 
that public necessity or convenience required 
should be left unfenced, such as the streets of 
a city or town, the depot, and station.47 
Perhaps the most important weapon the 
railroads used to defend their cases was the 
herd law. They constantly cited it in their 
attempts to prove contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs, which in turn 
could release the companies from their 
liability. Especially in Kansas, the issue was 
a hard-fought battle for the railroads. In one 
of the earliest cases, Central Branch Railroad 
Company v. Lea (1878), in which the plaintiff 
sued the railroad for killing one of her cows by 
its moving train, the Supreme Court accepted 
the railroad's assertion of contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff and found fault on both 
sides. The railroad, in violation of the law of 
1874, failed to fence its track where the cow 
was killed, but the owner did permit her cow 
to run at large at night in a county where both 
the night herd law of 1868 and the general 
herd law of 1872 were in force. The court held 
that the owner, in disregarding the statute, 
was equally at fault with the railroad com-
pany, and therefore could not recover.48 
On the other hand, the court maintained 
that the stock owner could collect damages if 
the owner obeyed the herd law but the railroad 
did not obey the fence law. Thus the owner of 
hogs that he kept and pastured on his land in a 
herd-law county could recover for a hog killed 
upon the railroad track, where it had strayed. 
Similarly, a farmer living in a county where the 
herd law was in force could recover for the loss 
of his hogs, which escaped, through no fault 
of his own, by breaking through his enclosure, 
regardless of whether or not the railroad had 
fenced the track, although a legal fence would 
not have prevented hogs from getting into the 
right of way.49 
By 1891 the emphasis had shifted. In the 
previously cited lawsuit brought by a sheep 
owner against Missouri Pacific for killing 
twelve sheep and injuring seventeen more, 
the railroad fence law became the key issue. 
The pasture was enclosed with a sheep-tight 
barbed-wire fence, but the railroad track that 
ran through the enclosure was not fenced. 
The railroad in its defense concentrated on 
the question of why the sheep strayed onto its 
right of way. The Supreme Court, however, 
maintained that if the railroad had enclosed 
its track with a lawful fence, it would not have 
been liable, even though the fence would not 
have kept the sheep off the track. Since it did 
not, the company was declared liable.50 
The pendulum shifted again by 1905, when 
the Missouri Pacific was once more sued, for 
killing three mules and a colt. The defen-
dant tried to find fault with the owner of the 
animals, but the court found that the stock 
killed were the ordinary farm stock kept in 
the owner's pasture enclosed with an ordinary 
fence in a county where the herd law was in 
force. Since the stock escaped without the 
owner's being at fault, the court held that the 
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owner of the stock could recover, regardless of 
the position of the railroad in the fence law of 
1874.51 Throughout the period the problem for 
the Kansas Supreme Court was a balancing act, 
deciding which law, the railroad fence law or 
the herd law, should be used to ascertain the 
extent of negligence for the injury or killing of 
stock on railroad tracks. 
In Texas, the railroads concentrated their 
efforts on proving contributory negligence in 
the plaintiff's conduct. They based their argu-
ments on the 1876 act "Preventing Certain 
Animals from Running at Large in Counties 
and Subdivisions," which authorized the 
county to restrict certain animals from run-
ning at large.52 The Texas courts had taken a 
position favorable to the railroads, fully con-
sidering the stock (herd) law to determine the 
liability of the railroad. Thus, where the stock 
law was in force, prohibiting stock from run-
ning at large, the degree of care that a railroad 
company was required to exercise in preventing 
injuries was much less than where there was no 
such law.53 
In Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway 
Company of Texas v. Tolbert (1907), an action 
to recover the value of a mule killed by the 
defendant's locomotives, a judgment was ren-
dered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of 
$175. The Texas Supreme Court, to which the 
railroad appealed, rejected the appellant's con-
tention that the stock law was legally in force 
in the county, because the court found the 
stock law petition defective. The court ruled, 
accordingly, that the railroad fence law (article 
5428) alone would control the case; without a 
stock law or with a defective stock law, there 
was nothing to modify the plaintiff's right of 
recovery.54 
The railroads suffered a major defeat in 
Nebraska, where the Supreme Court took a 
more clear-cut, hostile position. The court 
construed the statute of 1867, which made a 
railroad company liable for stock killed upon 
its track, in such a way that a railroad company 
was not relieved of liability even though the 
stock killed was running at large in violation 
of law. 
DUAL OBJECTIVES OF THE RAILROAD 
FENCE LAW 
In Burlington and Missouri River Railway 
Company v. Brinckman (1883), the Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that the railroad was 
liable for stock killed upon its track while 
running at large at night, although the 1877 
statute prohibited stock from running at large 
at night. The duty of the railroad to erect 
and maintain fences, the court explained, 
was for the public benefit and security as well 
as for the benefit of the cattle owners, and 
therefore the court considered the matter too 
important to leave to the thousand propri-
etors along the road. Nor were damages done 
to the cattle limited to those of the adjoining 
owners. The court further pointed out that 
the statute required all railroad companies to 
fence their tracks and to put in cattle guards 
at road crossings. If the railroad failed to do 
so, they should absolutely be liable to the 
owners of the stock killed or injured, and the 
question of negligence of the owner would 
not enter into the case. 55 
Two years later, in Chicago Burlington and 
Quincy Railway Company v. Sims (1885), the 
Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the con-
tention of the defendant railroad that the 
owner willfully and purposely had turned his 
animal loose to run at large and that evidence 
was not sufficient to prove that the accident 
had occurred because of the lack of fencing. 
Strictly following its Brinckman decision, the 
court made the railroad liable for the stock 
killed upon its track.56 
In Oklahoma, a fence-in country, no stock 
was allowed to run at large. Where a railroad 
was not required to fence its right of way but 
did so voluntarily, the railroad was not liable 
unless it was negligent by failing to keep 
the fence in good condition and as a result, 
trespassing cattle were killed.57 The railroad 
lost an important battle in 1912, however, 
when the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld 
Nebraska's Brinckman ruling, stating that the 
herd law did not alter the railroad's obligation 
to fence the rights of way. 58 The railroad's 
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refusal to construct a hog-proof fence border-
ing its right of way, despite the hog owner's 
request, was sufficient to make the company 
liable. 
CONCLUSION 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
herd law had become a standard rule, mark-
ing the end of the frontier in the Great Plains. 
By then not only were many western railroads 
forced to fence their rights of way, at least par-
tially, but also more stock owners voluntarily 
enclosed their lands as the cost of barbed-wire 
fencing became affordable. 
Consequently, lawsuits involving railroad 
fences dwindled to an insignificant number. 
It is difficult to speculate which was more 
economical for the railroads, to avoid their 
liability by fencing both sides of entire lines or 
by fighting lawsuits in court and successfully 
defending their cases. The railroads considered 
the fencing requirement a costly and unfair 
burden arbitrarily imposed on them. The legal 
forum the railroads chose to use, as defendants 
seeking solutions, was largely a disappoint-
ment. The law of railroad fencing, as the courts 
interpreted it, was never intended as, nor ever 
became, a vehicle to promote the interest of the 
railroad enterprise but came to serve mainly 
the interest of the stock owners along the track 
as well as to protect the passengers and their 
property. The vigorous defense the railroads 
put up, trying to safeguard their economic 
interest, however, did lead to an unexpected, 
important transformation of railroad fence law 
into a mature body of law. 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the twen-
tieth century the railroad fence law had fully 
developed into the railroad stock law, which 
came to impose liability on railroads "without 
regard to negligence" for the wounding or kill-
ing of animals by a train. The requirement 
that railroads fence their rights of way in 
order to avoid civil liability for the destruction 
of livestock by passing trains did drastically 
broaden railroad liability. This enlarged burden 
certainly might have been one of the state 
regulations imposed on the railroads, such as 
freight rates during the Gilded Age, that some 
historians have claimed were major factors in 
the eventual decline of American railroads. 
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